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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of a redrawing of political boundaries on voting patterns. It
investigates whether secession of states leads to gains in terms of better conformity of the elec-
torate's political preferences with those of the elected representatives. We study these issues in the
context of reorganization of states in India. Madhya Pradesh, the biggest state in India before the
reorganization, was subdivided into Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh in 2000, the latter account-
ing for less than one-fourth of the electorate of undivided Madhya Pradesh. Using socio-economic
composition and traditional voting patterns, we argue that there were dierences in political prefer-
ences between Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. However, in electoral democracies, the amount
of transfers that a constituency gets depends crucially on whether the local representative belongs to
the ruling party. Under these circumstances, we show in a theoretical context that when it is part of
the same state, the smaller region would vote strategically to elect representatives with preferences
more closely aligned to those of the bigger region. Once it constitutes a separate state however, this
motive would no longer operate. Exploiting detailed data on state elections in Madhya Pradesh and
Chhattisgarh in 1993, 1998 and 2003 and a dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy, we show
that these predictions are validated empirically|there is a signicant divergence in voting behavior
between the two regions in 2003 compared to the pre-reorganization period.
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The last two decades have witnessed the disintegration of several big countries and 
aring up of
regional separatist tendencies in many countries. For example, Yugoslavia broke up into several
new independent countries and many of the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union
became independent countries themselves. There were also widespread separatist movements,
claiming autonomy or self-rule, in countries like Canada in North America, Belgium, France,
Italy, Spain and UK in Europe, China, India, Indonesia and Turkey in Asia, and New Zealand
in Australasia.
This begs the question: what is the impact of break-up of a larger state, or of secession of
smaller regions from their parent state? This paper relates to this important issue. It analyzes
the impact of a redrawing of political boundaries on voting patterns, and more specically,
investigates whether a break-up of a larger state into its constituent units brings forth gains in
terms of a better conformity of the electorate's political preferences with those of their elected
representatives.
This paper addresses these questions in the context of the recent reorganization of states in
India. In its monsoon session in 2000 the Parliament of India passed the Madhya Pradesh Reor-
ganization Bill, the Uttar Pradesh Reorganization Bill and the Bihar Reorganization Bill. As a
result one smaller state was carved out of each of these three biggest states in India - Chhattis-
garh from Madhya Pradesh, Uttaranchal from Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand from Bihar. See
Figure 1 for a political map of India showing the dierent states after the reorganization.1 In
this paper we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, whether the 2000 reorganization
led to changes in voting patterns in the aected regions. For reasons discussed below we concen-
1 Before the reorganization, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh together constituted Madhya Pradesh, Uttar
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh together constituted Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and Jharkhand, Bihar.
1trate on Madhya Pradesh, which was the biggest state in India before its eastern part became
a separate state called Chhattisgarh in November 2000.
Drawing evidence from the socio-economic composition of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh
and traditional voting patterns of dierent cultures, groups and regions, we argue that political
preferences were dierent in the two regions. Next, in a theoretical context, we show that the
divergence in preferences would lead to very dierent voting patterns of Chhattisgarh residents
before and after reorganization. In electoral democracies, the amount of transfers that a con-
stituency2 gets depends crucially on whether the local representative belongs to the ruling party.3
Under these circumstances, we argue that when they were part of undivided Madhya Pradesh,
the residents of Chhattisgarh would vote strategically to elect representatives with preferences
more closely aligned to those of the residents of Madhya Pradesh proper. Once they constitute
a separate state however, this motive would no longer operate. We exploit detailed data on
elections to the undivided Madhya Pradesh legislature in 1993 and 1998 together with data on
elections to the (post-reorganization) Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh legislatures in 2003
to analyze the regional voting trends pre and post-reorganization. Our dierence-in-dierences
estimates show that voting patterns of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh were surprisingly
similar before the reorganization, while they were strikingly dierent after.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. The rst is the literature on the importance
of transfers in electoral competition in a representative democracy. A number of studies provide
evidence that discretionary grants are often handed out in a partisan manner, with electoral
considerations playing an important part. Recent works in this literature include Ansolabehere
and Snyder (2003), Finan (2003), Miguel and Zaidi (2003) and Porto and Sanguinetti (2001).
2 In India, a state legislature is known as a legislative assembly, and state legislative districts are referred to
as assembly constituencies. In what follows we shall use the word constituency and seat interchangeably to refer
to a legislative district.
3 See below and footnote 16 in section 4 for several references, including examples from India.
2Ansolabehere and Snyder (2003) show that in the U.S., ruling parties skew the distribution of
grants in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest political support. In particular,
counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the ruling party receive larger shares of
state transfers. Miguel and Zaidi (2003) nd that in Ghana administrative districts where the
ruling party won all parliamentary seats in the 1996 elections received 27 percent more school
funding in 1998-99. Finan (2003) provides evidence that federal deputies in Brazil reward
municipalities based on political support. Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) show that in Argentina,
over-represented provinces, both at the senate and at the lower chamber, receive higher resources
from the national government compared to less represented provinces. In the Indian context,
Khemani (2003) shows that the ruling party at the national level provides greater resources to
state governments that are politically aliated with it and that are important in maximizing
the party's representation in the national legislature. In our study we argue that transfers play
an important role in people's voting decisions and that this has important implications for the
gains to be had from a redrawing of political boundaries.
The second strand of literature involves recent studies of endogenous formation of political
entities. The standard argument is that in deciding where to draw the political boundaries,
residents trade o the advantage of a larger state in providing public services at a lower cost
against the disadvantage of increased heterogeneity of preferences that is present in a larger
entity. In other words, when contemplating a move towards separation (or integration), electors
weigh the eciency benets of being part of a larger state (and a larger market) against the
benets to be had from having a government that is more closely aligned to the preferences of
the people. In one of the earliest contributions to this literature, Alesina and Spolaore (1997)
nd that democratization leads to secession and to an ineciently high number of countries,
while economic integration increases the incentive for political separation. Bolton and Roland
3(1997) emphasize political con
icts over redistribution policies. They argue that a breakup is
more likely when regions dier in their income distributions, and when the eciency gains from
unication are small. Goyal and Staal (2004) nd that unication takes place between similar
sized regions, and that majority voting leads to excessive separation from a majority point of
view, just like in Alesina and Spolaore. For good in-depth reviews of this literature, see Alesina,
Perotti and Spolaore (1995), Bolton, Roland and Spolaore (1996) and Alesina and Spolaore
(2003).
Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) focus on local political jurisdictions (school districts and
municipalities in the U.S.) and nd evidence of tradeo between economies of scale and racial
heterogeneity, but little evidence in favor of the tradeo between economies of scale and income
heterogeneity. Thus there are quite a few studies that analyze the tradeo between economies
of scale and homogeneity of preferences in the formation of nations. However, there is no study
thus far that seeks to empirically analyze the gains that can be had from a break-up of states.
This paper lls this important gap. Moreover, this paper is the rst to use political preferences
and changes in relative voting patterns after a break-up to investigate and assess the extent of
gains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the rationale for focusing
on Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, rather than the other states which also underwent a reor-
ganization. Section 3 argues that due to various reasons, including the demographic composition
of the respective populations, the political preferences of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are
dierent. In Section 4 we set up a simple theoretical model to analyze voting behavior of states
before and after secession. Section 5 discusses the data and the estimation strategy. Section 6
presents the empirical results and performs further robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
42 Why Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh?
We have chosen this particular pair of states, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, for several
reasons. First, the boundaries of each assembly constituency remained the same following the
reorganization, whether they remained within Madhya Pradesh or formed part of the new
Chhattisgarh. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh - after
the breakup, 90 of them fell in the new state (Chhattisgarh), the other 230 comprised the
new Madhya Pradesh legislative assembly. This enables us to compare the voting patterns of
the constituencies in the two states across pre- and post-reorganization elections to the state
legislatures. In the partition of Bihar too, constituency boundaries were left unchanged. How-
ever, this was not the case for Uttar Pradesh. Since Uttaranchal was carved out of a relatively
small part of the state, the existing 22 assembly constituencies were subdivided into 70 smaller
ones. This creates a problem for tracking down voter behavior because we would ideally like to
compare within-constituency changes in voter behavior across pre and post-breakup elections.
With changes in constituency boundaries, the true eect of any shift in voter preferences will
be confounded with changes in composition of the constituencies.
Second, unlike most other states in India, the political system in Madhya Pradesh and
Chhattisgarh revolves around two major national parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP
from now on) and the Indian National Congress (INC). Typically these parties together account
for more than 80% of the votes polled in these states, and over 90% of the assembly seats.4
The only other important parties in the two states are Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the
Samajwadi Party (SP). However, even apart from the fact that the support for these parties is
4 In the elections to the (undivided) Madhya Pradesh state legislature in 1998, the BJP and the INC together
got 79.87% of the total votes polled. In terms of actual seats, the two parties together won 91% (291 out of 320).
In 2003 elections, the two parties secured 211 out of the 230 seats in Madhya Pradesh, and 87 out of the 90 seats
in Chhattisgarh. See Table 3 for details.
5low and concentrated in particular pockets,5 there do not seem to have been any major changes
in support for them in the few years before and after the breakup.6 In most other states in India,
third parties (together with smaller regional parties) have a considerable amount of leverage.
This can become a problem because parties often enter into electoral alliances just before the
elections. If the composition of an alliance changes from one election to the other it could be
dicult to extricate the change in support for a particular party from that of the change in
composition of the alliance. For example, in Uttar Pradesh the four largest parties - BJP, SP,
BSP and INC - often enter into alliances with each other and with other smaller regional parties
that make it dicult to ascertain the true change in support for one particular party. Similar
is the case in Bihar, where factions of the original Janata Dal party and other smaller parties
make the electoral system much more multi-party and in a state of 
ux.
Third, there have been elections to the state legislature in undivided Madhya Pradesh in
1998, and to the legislatures in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh in 2003. Since these straddle
2000, the year in which the reorganization took place, we can pursue a dierence-in-dierences
estimation strategy and compare the voting patterns of Chhattisgarh residents pre and post
breakup. There has recently been elections to the state legislatures in Bihar and Jharkhand
(February 2005) - the rst after their reorganization. However, the last elections in undivided
Bihar were held in February 2000 - too close to the passage of the Bihar reorganization bill in the
parliament in that summer - so these 2000 elections may not oer a clean pre-program event.7
There have been assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal in February 2002, but as
5 For example, the BSP draws most of its support from the region in northern Madhya Pradesh called Vindhya
Pradesh. Vindhya Pradesh borders Uttar Pradesh, the main political base of the BSP.
6 Since we follow a dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy, a change in support for these parties would
bias our results only if this support changed dierentially across the two states. This does not seem to have been
the case. For example, the BSP and SP together got 5.5% and 11% of the total votes polled in Chhattisgarh and
Madhya Pradesh respectively in 2003. In the 1998 assembly elections, this gure was 5.8% for Chhattisgarh and
9.5% for Madhya Pradesh.
7 There are other problems in looking at the Bihar reorganization, see below.
6mentioned above, signicant problems are created by changes in constituency boundaries in the
latter state as well as the major role played by smaller parties.
Fourth, the breakup in Madhya Pradesh was supported equally by both the main parties, BJP
and INC. So any change in relative voting patterns in Chhattisgarh in the post-breakup period
cannot be explained in terms of either party being `rewarded' or `punished' for help or hindrance
in creation of the state. There is no evidence that the voters favored either of the two parties
on this issue. Bihar, on the other hand, is very dierent from Madhya Pradesh. The ruling
Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) party in Bihar, and its leader (Laloo Prasad Yadav), were opposed
to the split, primarily because though the support for RJD was concentrated in the northern
part of the state, they were afraid of losing the mineral-rich southern part (which eventually
formed Jharkhand). On the other hand the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), another important
political party in Bihar, had been actively demanding separate statehood for Jharkhand - it is
arguable that in the post-breakup elections voters who had otherwise supported RJD in the past
but preferred statehood for Jharkhand would want to switch their votes to reward JMM.
Fifth, neither the BJP nor the INC had any added stake in the split of Madhya Pradesh.
Since the constituency boundaries were not redrawn after the breakup, popular representation,
in terms of the number of seats, remained the same both at the national and state legislatures,
unlike in the reorganization of Uttar Pradesh.8 An analogy to the case of Washington D.C. in the
U.S. can be illuminative. Since Washington D.C. overwhelmingly votes in favor of Democratic
candidates, it is arguable that ceteris paribus, Democrats would have a strategic interest to
support statehood for D.C. Every state in the U.S. sends two senators to the Senate, and two
8 Apart from an increase in the total number of assembly constituencies in Uttaranchal there were also changes
in the number of seats reserved for dierent groups. Earlier, out of 22 assembly seats that this region had in
undivided Uttar Pradesh, 3 and 1 were reserved for members belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes respectively. Now, out of 70 seats in the new legislature, 11 and 3 are similarly reserved. Note that in the
reorganization of Madhya Pradesh, the same constituencies were reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes both before and after the breakup.
7additional senators from the Democratic Party might shift the balance of power in the senate,
which is otherwise closely divided between the two main parties, Republicans and Democrats.
A nal point to note is that the main reason undivided Madhya Pradesh was subdivided
into two separate entities was the large size of the state, both in terms of area and population,
and signicant cultural and linguistic heterogeneity across the eastern and western parts of the
state.9 This further attests to the exogeneity of the breakup. As seen in Table 1, at the time of
the split Madhya Pradesh had a population of about 80 million people - if it were an independent
country it would be the 13th most populous in the world, just after Germany.10 By comparison,
California, the biggest state in the U.S., had only a population of 36 million on July 1, 2004 and
Texas at that time had only 22 million people.11 Madhya Pradesh was also the largest state in
India in terms of geographic area before the breakup.
3 Heterogeneity of Preferences across Madhya Pradesh and Chhat-
tisgarh
We argue that political preferences, particularly as it relates to voting for each of the two
major parties, are dierent across these two states. Table 1 shows some summary statistics for
Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.12 In terms of population, Chhattisgarh is about one-third
the size of post-reorganization Madhya Pradesh. It is more rural and has a higher percentage of
females. It also has a much higher child female-to-male ratio compared to Madhya Pradesh (and
9 The boundaries of provinces in pre-independence (pre-1947) India were not drawn on the basis of language,
religion or culture, so that most of the provinces were multi-lingual and multi-cultural. The arguments for
redrawing of state boundaries in the post-independence period, including in the 2000 reorganization, were mostly
based on administrative convenience and dierences in heritage and socio-cultural preferences.
10 See the 2002 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau, available online at
http://www.prb.org/pdf/WorldPopulationDS02 Eng.pdf.
11 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, State Rankings - Statistical Abstract of the United States, available at
http://www.census.gov/statab/ranks/rank01.html.
12 For ease of comparison we show the relevant all-India numbers in the last column.
8all-India), both in the rural and urban sectors. Chhattisgarh also ranks higher than Madhya
Pradesh in most of the demographic indicators, having lower values for the birth rate, death
rate, natural growth rate and infant mortality rate. Another important demographic feature
is the presence of a large tribal population in Chhattisgarh, as compared to Madhya Pradesh.
Though the proportion of Scheduled Castes is similar across the two states, the proportion of
Scheduled Tribes in the former is more than double that in the latter.13 We argue below that
these demographics have important consequences for preferring one party over the other at the
hustings.
Tables 2(a), (b) and (c) show the support for the BJP and the INC across dierent segments
of the population. In the Indian context, the BJP is seen to be the right-wing party, with a
strong focus on traditional upper caste Hindu way of life, while the INC is considered to be
a left-of-center socialist-leaning party. Table 2(a) shows that the support for BJP vis--vis the
INC increases almost dramatically as one moves from the lower-ranking backward castes to the
higher ones.14 Among the SCs and the STs, the most disadvantaged sections of the Indian
population, a majority support the INC. At the other end of the spectrum however, among the
13 In India demographic groups designated as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes constitute the most
disadvantaged sections of the population and have traditionally been discriminated against by other better-o
groups. After independence in 1947, in an eort to help integration of these groups in the mainstream, some
constituencies have been reserved for them, where candidates belonging to only these groups can be elected. The
number of constituencies reserved is based on the actual proportions of these groups in the population, and thus
represents their respective political clout. We proxy the importance of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in
each state by the respective number of assembly constituencies reserved for candidates belonging to these groups.
14 The gures refer to all-India, and are not available for individual states or regions. However, it is widely
believed that these trends are broadly true in individual states. Consider e.g. the results of a survey conducted
in Kerala, a state in southern India, by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies. In Kerala the two most
important political groups are the communist-led Left Democratic Front and the INC-led United Democratic
Front (UDF), with BJP coming in third. Among the higher castes like the Nairs and the Ezhavas, the BJP has
strong support in spite of its third position in the entire state - in fact, 31% of Nairs support the BJP, compared
to 29% for the UDF. This is a large dierence taking into account the fact that the UDF was one of the two major
parties and BJP has a considerably smaller role in Kerala. Among the lower castes (dalits and the adivasis), the
UDF has a much greater support. The gender divide is also sharp - for males the support for INC and BJP is at
39% and 13% respectively, compared to 52% and 7% for the females. See Gopa Kumar (1999).
9Kayasthas less than one-third support the INC, and among the Brahmins support for this party
is only about a fourth. Table 2(b) shows that there are dierences in support for these two
parties across gender too. For males, a clear majority is seen to prefer the BJP. Females, on
the other hand, are tied between the two parties, indicating that they prefer INC relative to the
males.
Table 2(c), which is taken from an earlier survey done by the same group, shows basically
the same trends, though now the absolute level of support for the INC is somewhat stronger.
The parties are virtually in a dead heat in general (rst column), but the level of support diers
signicantly across the various groups. Once again, the upper castes prefer BJP and the lower
castes prefer INC. One interesting nding is that in the rural areas the INC is preferred to the
BJP, and vice versa.
Looking back at Table 1, it seems reasonable to argue that the relative support for the INC
would be higher in Chhattisgarh, and vice versa. First, Chhattisgarh has a higher share of
females in the population, as well as a higher sex-ratio (female-to-male ratio). Second, Chhat-
tisgarh is less urban than Madhya Pradesh. Third, and perhaps most important, Chhattisgarh
has a very high share of STs in the population. SCs and STs together account for almost
half the population of Chhattisgarh. In Madhya Pradesh, this gure is less than one-fourth.
The popularity that the INC enjoys among women, rural people and the backward classes, as
seen in Tables 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c), should make political preferences in Madhya Pradesh and
Chhattisgarh quite dierent.
104 Theoretical Framework
We set up a theoretical model to analyze the voting behavior of a region before and after secession
from a parent state. Two regions A and B initially form part of a single state. Each of the
regions A and B consists of multiple constituencies. After the break-up, the state splits into
two independent and separate states: A and B.
There are two parties X and Y . The party that wins the majority of seats or constituencies
in a state wins in that state. One of the regions, say A, is considerably bigger than the other in
terms of the size of the electorate and the number of constituencies.
Preferences of individuals within a constituency are assumed to be homogenous, but dier





ij denotes the utility that constituency i in region k gets if party
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region k, k = fA;Bg gets by electing a representative from party j, j = fX;Y g. tk
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i denotes the ideological bias of constituency i in region k toward
party X. A positive value of k
i implies that constituency i has a bias in favor of party X and
vice-versa. k
i is distributed in the interval [-1,1] with density function f k(i) and distribution
function F k(i). The distribution of i diers across regions A and B. Regions A and B prefer
opposing parties. Assume region A prefers party X. If there was sincere voting, party X would
gain majority in A and party Y in B. The distribution of i in region A rst order stochastically
dominates that in B. The median of i in region A exceeds zero while that in B is less than
zero. We assume that #AX+#BX > #AY +#BY , where #AX (#BX) denotes the number of
15 This assumption is made for simplicity. All results hold if preferences of individuals within a constituency
are heterogeneous.
11constituencies in region A (B) which ideologically prefer party X, that is, for which A
i (B
i ) > 0.
On the other hand, #AY (#BY ) denotes the number of constituencies in region A (B) for which
A
i (B
i ) < 0. This assumption implies that the relative preference for party X in region A is
larger than that for party Y in region B.
The transfer that constituency i in region k receives if party j is elected in i is denoted by tk
ij.
We assume that redistribution is along party lines.16 The amount of transfers that a constituency
in region k gets depends on whether the local representative belongs to the ruling party at the




iL) denotes the transfer that constituency i
gets if it elects a candidate from the ruling (losing) party. For simplicity, we assume tk
iW = tW
and tk
iL = tL. These transfers are nanced by taxes that are equally paid by all constituencies.
The utility function u(:) is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in its argument. The
preferences of all constituencies are perfectly observable and we allow for strategic voting.17
Now consider the voting behavior of the constituencies in region B before the break-up. The
constituencies observe voting preferences in region A and correctly anticipate that the winner in
A, as well as the overall state, will be party X. Consider constituency i in region B. If I B
iX > IB
iY ,
constituency i elects a representative from party X. If IB
iX < IB
iY , electing a representative from
16 There is now ample evidence that the redistributive pattern implicit in a system of intergovernmental grants
cannot be entirely explained on normative grounds of equity and eciency. In addition to the studies mentioned
in the introduction, the list includes Mobarak et al (2004) and Rozevitch and Weiss (1991). Mobarak et al
(2004) examine health services provision and access in Brazilian counties and nd that the per capita provision
of doctors, nurses and clinics is greater in counties where the county mayor and state governor are politically
aligned. Rozevitch and Weiss (1991) show that transfers from the central government to municipalities in Israel
depended on whether the mayor belonged to the ruling party at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. Note that
we only need to assume that a signicant part of the redistribution is along party lines - all results go through
if in addition to this there is a substantial amount of region-specic redistribution. Note that since region A is
substantially larger than region B in terms of the number of constituencies (Chhattisgarh has 90 constituencies,
Madhya Pradesh has 230), theoretically the amount of region-specic transfers to Chhattisgarh can be zero.
17 The assumption that #AX+#BX > #AY +#BY is made for simplicity. It implies that before the break-up,
the party that enjoys majority support in region A enjoys overall majority support in the (undivided) state. All
results continue to hold under the assumption that the probability of the majority party in A winning in the
overall state is larger than the probability of the minority party in A winning in the overall state.
12party X yields utility UB
iX=IB
iX + u(tW). On the other hand, electing a representative from
party Y yields utility UB
iY =IB
iY + u(tL). Therefore, constituency i elects a representative from
party X if and only if:
IB




iY > u(tL)   u(tW)
or, B
i > u(tL)   u(tW)
Note that u(tL)   u(tW) < 0.18 There exists a cuto  2 [ 1;0),  = u(tL)   u(tW)
such that all constituencies with i >  in region B elect a candidate from party X and all
constituencies with i <  elect a candidate from party Y . The key insight is that because
redistribution is party-specic, residents in some of the constituencies in the smaller region B
will vote strategically to elect representatives with preferences more closely aligned to those of
residents in region A. For these constituencies, there will be a utility loss in electing representa-
tives with preferences less closely aligned to their own, but this will be swamped by the utility
gain from having a large transfer.19
After the break-up, the party that enjoys majority support in B (Y ) wins in region B.
Strategic voting implies that constituencies with positive i suciently close to zero elect rep-
resentatives from party Y . Therefore, prior to the break-up, voting pattern in region B will
resemble that in A, while voting pattern after the break-up is likely to be comparatively dis-
parate between the two regions. The representatives elected to the state legislature will then
conform more closely to the inherent (ideological) preferences of region B.20 Thus, in the pres-
ence of divergent preferences between regions, a break-up leads to a welfare gain in the smaller
18 We assume that the u(:) function, tax and transfers are such that u(tW)   u(tL) < 1.
19 Note that some constituencies in A with i below zero but suciently close to zero would nd it protable
to elect a candidate from party X.
20 The party preferred by the median constituency will now prevail in region B.
13region.21
Proposition: Under divergent preferences, party specic transfers and strategic voting,
voting distribution of the smaller region mimics that of the parent state. Secession from the
parent state yields comparatively disparate voting patterns.
Next, we investigate the voting behavior of region B before and after secession from A under
an alternative formulation of transfers. Transfers are now assumed to be targeted to a region as a
whole (A or B) instead of a constituency. Examples of such transfers are constructing a highway
through region B, building an industry in region B, etc. (Transfers in the previous formulation
can be thought of as local public goods such as building tube-wells, paving a local road, etc.)
The transfers obtained by a region depend on the proportion of its representatives belonging
to the ruling party. Transfers are still nanced equally by all constituencies. Specically, if T
represents the total taxes collected by the state, and wA and wB the number of ruling party
representatives in regions A and B respectively, then transfers to region A (tA) and that to
region B (tB) are respectively represented by:
tA = wA
wA+wB:T
and tB = wB
wA+wB:T
The crucial dierence with the previous formulation is that a change in voting behavior of a
certain constituency aects not only transfers and utility of that constituency but also those of
the other constituencies. The utility of a constituency i in region k from electing a representative
from party j is given by Uk
ij=Ik
ij + u(tk). Assume that the number of constituencies in regions
A and B are given by #A and #B.
Consider the voting pattern in region B before the break-up. A constituency that is ide-
21 Note that secession does not aect the voting pattern of constituencies in region A. Constituencies that
elected representatives from their less preferred party still continue to do so after the break-up.
14ologically biased in favor of party X elects a candidate from that party. A constituency that
ideologically identies itself with party Y correctly anticipates voting behavior in all other con-
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denotes the equilibrium wA, such that all constituencies with B
i > 
B elect a candidate from
party X while all constituencies with B
i < 
B from party Y . The basic message is that when
constituencies care about their ideological preferences as well as material gains, constituencies
that are ideologically biased against the winning party (but are not too far away from the
ideologically neutral constituency) will sacrice their ideological biases in favor of material gains
and vote for the winning party.
In region A constituencies that prefer party X vote for X. Constituencies ideologically biased
in favor of Y vote for X if and only if:
A
i >  [u( wA
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1 (wA;:)
At equilibrium, wA = #A[1   FA(A
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A elect
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B 1 and u(:) is concave, it follows that 
B < 
A.
15Therefore, in the smaller region B, constituencies in a larger range of i ([
B;0)) choose to switch
in favor of the party they are ideologically biased against as compared to region A ([
A;0)). The
intuition here is as follows. Since proportion of transfers is smaller in B, switching one vote in
favor of X in B increases the proportion and hence the actual transfers by more than that
in region A. In other words, region A constituting of a larger number of constituencies is
more likely to be subject to the free-rider problem and will be reluctant to switch in favor of
their ideologically less preferred party. After the break-up, party Y will win in region B. The
transfers nanced by region B are now targeted to the entire region B. The previous motive
for strategically voting for their non-preferred party no longer operates|all constituencies now
vote sincerely according to their inherent preferences.
This formulation of transfers once again conrms that prior to the break-up, voting pat-
tern of the smaller region conforms closely to that in the parent state while secession leads to
comparatively divergent voting patterns between the regions. Thus secession leads to gains in
that it leads to a closer alignment of the preferences of the electorate with that of the elected
representatives.
5 Data and Empirical Strategy
5.1 Data
Most of the data used in this paper come from the Election Commission of India, which main-
tains a detailed database of election statistics for the national parliament and for each state
assembly. For the most part we use data from the last two assembly elections - 1998 assembly
elections in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and the 2003 assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh
and Chhattisgarh. In the section on robustness checks we also use data for the 1993 assembly
16elections, as well as data from the last two national parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2004.22
The data reported in Table 1 come primarily from the 2001 Census of India. The data in Table
2 come from various surveys conducted over the years, as reported in the sources mentioned.
5.2 Empirical Strategy
Table 3 shows the performance of BJP and INC in the 1998 and 2003 state elections. For the
1998 elections, when Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh formed part of the same state, we show
the number of seats won by INC and BJP in each region separately. The INC had a comfortable
majority in 1998, but was defeated by the BJP in both states in 2003.
The interesting thing to note is that in 1998 the performances of BJP and INC are very
similar across the two regions of the state. For example, the BJP won 38.84% of the votes in
Madhya Pradesh and 39.11% in Chhattisgarh. The respective numbers for the INC are 41.21%
and 41.01%. The percentage of seats won by the two parties was also very similar across the two
regions. In the 2003 elections, however, there was a clear divergence - while the BJP swept to
power in both states, the INC did much better, in a relative sense, in Chhattisgarh. In 1998 the
BJP-INC dierential in the percentage of votes won was -2.37% in Madhya Pradesh and -1.90%
in Chhattisgarh, with a net dierential of about -0.47%. In 2003 the respective dierentials in
the two states are 10.90% and 2.55%, with a net dierential of about 8.35%. The dierence
is also very large for the percentage of seats won - the net dierentials, similarly dened, are
-4.5% in 1998 and 44.3% in 2003. This seems to suggest a change in relative voting patterns
in these two regions after reorganization. In what follows we pursue this further by using more
sophisticated econometric techniques and ruling out confounding factors.
To compare the relative voting trends in the two regions pre and post reorganization we
22 In India, elections to the state assembly and national legislatures are held every ve years.
17run the following regression, separately for each party, BJP and INC. We use data from state
assembly elections in 1998 and 2003. The unit of observation is an assembly constituency.
Yikt =  + 0  DCH + 
0  Y r 2003 + 0  (DCH  Y r 2003) + ikt (1)
Here Yikt is a measure of electoral performance of the party in constituency i in state (or
region) k in year t. DCH is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency forms part
of Chhattisgarh, 0 otherwise. Y r 2003 is similarly a dummy variable for 2003. We are interested
in the estimate of 0, which can be interpreted in this context as a dierence-in-dierences
estimate for voting behavior.
We use three dierent measures of electoral performance - whether the seat in question was
won by the respective party, the number of votes obtained by the party in the constituency, and
the percentage of votes polled by the party in the constituency. We name the variables bjpwin,
bjpvote and bjppcvote (for BJP), and congwin, congvote and congpcvote (for INC). We estimate
equation (1) by simple OLS. We also estimate the corresponding xed eects regressions, where
we compare the within-constituency changes across years. For bjpwin and congwin (which
are 0-1 dummies), we also run probit regressions. All standard errors reported are robust to
heteroscedasticity. Apart from these trends, we also look at the trends in voter turnout to
investigate whether the possibility of a more eective exercising of franchise of Chhattisgarh
residents in 2003 increased their turnout.
5.2.1 Accounting for voter turnout, within-district correlations and outliers
However, the analysis above can be plagued by various issues. We consider them one by one.
First, a potential concern is that part of any change in voting pattern that we may observe in 2003
is due to changes in voter turnout rather than actual change in voting behavior. To investigate
18this issue, we run alternative regressions for the three measures of electoral performance for
each party where we control for voter turnout. Second, since each district consists of multiple
constituencies, there may be local factors that in
uence voting across neighboring constituencies.
Not controlling for these within district correlations might bias conclusions. Therefore, we report
standard errors which allow for arbitrary within-district correlations.23 Third, there are nine
constituencies where neither the BJP nor the INC emerged as either the winner or the runner-
up. Since these are only 9 out of a total of 640 (1993 and 1998 elections taken together), these
constituencies might be considered as outliers. Therefore, we repeat the analysis above after
dropping the outliers.
5.2.2 Is the 1998 voting pattern a year specic eect?
A potential concern is that if we nd that the voting pattern of Chhattisgarh is similar to that of
Madhya Pradesh in 1998, it may be caused by a year-specic eect, rather than by Chhattisgarh
residents voting strategically to mimic Madhya Pradesh voting behavior. If strategic voting is
the cause, then the resemblance in voting behavior should be a characteristic of other pre-
reorganization years also, for example 1993. As a check on the validity of the results, we include
data for the 1993 assembly elections to undivided Madhya Pradesh also and check whether both
the pre-reorganization years are characterized by similarity of voting patterns between the two
regions and the post-reorganization year characterized by a divergence in voting behavior. We
run the following regression
Yikt =  + 0  DCH + 
0  Y r 1998 + 0  (DCH  Y r 1998)
+ 
1  Y r 2003 + 1  (DCH  Y r 2003) + ikt (2)
23 A district is an administrative unit in India, similar to counties in the U.K. and U.S. There are 45 districts
in Madhya Pradesh and 16 in Chhattisgarh. So the average district has about 5 constituencies in the former and
5.5 in the latter.
19As earlier, Yikt is a measure of electoral performance of the party in constituency i in state
(or region) k in year t. DCH is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency forms
part of Chhattisgarh, 0 otherwise. Y r 1998 and Y r 2003 are dummy variables for 1998 and 2003
respectively. Our parameters of interest are 0 and 1.
5.2.3 Ruling out the eect of exogenous shocks that may aect dierent demo-
graphic groups dierently
Another concern relates to the fact that the demographic composition of Madhya Pradesh is
dierent from that of Chhattisgarh. If there were any exogenous shocks (policy changes or
otherwise) between the two rounds of assembly elections in 1998 and 2003 that aected dierent
demographic groups dierently, then these shocks, rather than the reorganization itself, might
be the reason behind the divergence in voting patterns, if any, that we might observe.
To rule out such factors, we consider the following thought experiment, exploiting national
elections to the Indian parliament. Apart from electing representatives to the respective state
legislatures, all citizens of India also elect representatives to the national parliament, called the
Lok Sabha. Since it is the same electorate that vote in both the state and national elections,
any exogenous change that dierentially aected residents of the two states would get re
ected
in the national elections in addition to state assembly elections. This is particularly so since
the national elections in this case (April 2004) closely followed the state assembly elections
(November 2003). We hypothesize that in the absence of any such extraneous factors the two
regions would vote in exactly the same way in the post-reorganization parliamentary elections
as they did in the pre-reorganization elections.24 In other words, the motive behind the shift
24 This is because Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are both very small entities in terms of the size of the
electorate, when compared to the nation as a whole. Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament, consists
of 543 elected members, out of which Madhya Pradesh elects only 29 (slightly more than 5%) and Chhattisgarh
elects only 11 (2%). The party or coalition winning a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha forms the government,
20in voting behavior at the state level would not be operative here, and the two regions should
continue to vote at the national elections in same way as before.25
Using data for the parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2004, which straddle 2000, the year
of the breakup, we check if there has been any dierence in the voting patterns of the two states
following the breakup. The strategy here is to check whether Chhattisgarh residents exhibited a
dierent voting pattern, compared to Madhya Pradesh, in the 2003 assembly elections over and
above their voting pattern in the 2004 national elections. Dierencing out the relative change
in voting pattern of Chhattisgarh residents in the 2004 parliamentary elections, if any, helps to
get rid of the eect of other confounding factors that might aect the voting patterns of the
dierent demographic groups dierently in the two regions.
5.2.4 Is change in voting pattern an artifact of change in demographic composi-
tion?
Another factor which might in principle bias our results is if the demographic composition of
Chhattisgarh changed with respect to Madhya Pradesh between the 1998 and 2003 assembly
elections. Recall that dierent demographic groups are dierently disposed towards the two
parties, and it is conceivable that a relative increase in the proportion of female voters or lower
caste voters in Chhattisgarh increases the vote share of the INC in that state in 2003. Note,
however, that we are looking at only a 5-year interval between the two assembly elections - it is
highly unlikely that there were signicant demographic changes during this short span of time
which aected the two states dierently. Unlike in the U. S., mobility or migration, particularly
from one state to another, is not very high in India and is not likely to play a major role.
just like the House of Commons in Britain. Elections are held every ve years, unless any party or alliance fails
to garner or maintain majority support in the Lok Sabha.
25 Recall that, as noted in Section 2, the reorganization did not aect the composition of the national parliament.
After the breakup, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh continue to send the same number of representatives to
the parliament as before.
21Unfortunately, we do not have data on the number of (and changes in) lower caste voters
and higher caste voters by assembly constituency. But we do have data on the number and
percentage of female electors in each constituency in each year. So we check for any change
in these variables by running regressions similar to equations (1) and (2) with the number and
percentage of female electors in a constituency as the dependent variable.
Note that the analysis described in the last subsection using parliamentary elections also
helps to shed light on this issue. If there is indeed any change in demographic patterns, that will
undoubtedly be re
ected in the voting for the national elections also. Therefore, dierencing
out the relative change in voting pattern in national elections as outlined above will help to take
care of any eects on voting pattern due to changes in demographic compositions.
6 Results
Voter turnout
First, we look at the trends in voter turnout in the two elections. Table 4 shows the results from
running equation (1) on the percentage of total electors who voted in these elections. In the
1998 elections there were no statistically signicant dierences in turnout across constituencies
in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. In the 2003 elections, turnout increased by a large margin
in Madhya Pradesh, and interestingly, by an even larger margin in Chhattisgarh.
It is often argued that decentralization brings political power closer to the masses, and in turn
leads to a larger interest in political aairs. This may explain part of the increase in turnout in
Chhattisgarh in 2003. When Chhattisgarh was part of Madhya Pradesh, due to the divergence
in preferences, some Chhattisgarh residents may not have found it worthwhile to exercise their
franchise.
22Performance of INC
Table 5 shows the results from running equation (1) on congwin (the rst four columns), congvote
(next four) and congpcvote (nal four columns). Even-numbered columns are weighted by the
total number of electors in a constituency. For congwin we show the results for probit and FE
regressions; the results for OLS are very similar. For the others we show both OLS and FE
results.
We begin with the results for congwin. These show that in 1998 there was no dierence
in support for the INC across Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. In 2003 the BJP did much
better. In India there is a strong anti-incumbency factor in most elections - the ruling parties
are overthrown by large margins at the hustings, often only to bounce back to power at the next
election. Some such force was probably at work here, since the INC had been in power in both
Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh from 1998 to 2003. Interestingly, however, the losses for INC
were not equally spread across the two states. In Madhya Pradesh the party performed really
poorly, with the probability of winning a seat going down by almost 40%. The losses were much
more modest in Chhattisgarh, where the decrease was about 10% or even less.
The results for congvote and congpcvote mirror the same pattern. For example, in 2003 the
INC's share of votes in an average constituency went down by about 10% in Madhya Pradesh, a
quite large margin. In Chhattisgarh however the decrease was generally less than 5%. In terms
of actual votes obtained in each constituency - congvote - the results are similar and statistically
signicant in both the OLS and FE regressions.26
26 A large part of the Yr 2003 eect on number of votes polled is presumably due to population growth, and
not due to a switch in party preference.
23Performance of BJP
Table 6 shows the results for the BJP. Note rst that like for INC, there is no evidence of any
dierence in electoral support for BJP across Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh in 1998, as
shown by the small and insignicant coecient on the Chhattisgarh dummy. For bjpwin and
bjppcvote, as expected, the eects mirror those seen in Table 5. The BJP dealt a comprehensive
defeat to the Congress in Madhya Pradesh, with the former's probability of winning a seat
increasing by as much as 40% compared to 1998. In Chhattisgarh the increase was much muted,
increasing by only about 13-14%. Similarly, the increase in the percentage of votes polled by
BJP in an average seat in Chhattisgarh (less than 1%) was less than a third of that in Madhya
Pradesh (3.5%). The picture is similar for bjpvote,| the increase in the number of votes polled
by BJP was bigger in Madhya Pradesh than in Chhattisgarh, though the OLS coecients on
the interaction terms are not signicant.
Accounting for voter turnout, within-district correlations and outliers
We now provide evidence that these results are reasonably robust. Tables 7 and 8 report results
from three robustness checks. First, the empirical analysis above reveals that the voter turnout
increased in 2003 and especially in Chhattisgarh. To ascertain that the divergence of voting
behavior is not a mere artifact of increased voter turnout, we run the regressions for the party
specic outcome variables while controlling for voter turnout. Second, since a district consists
of many constituencies, there may be common factors that in
uence voting across neighboring
constituencies. Therefore, we control for within district correlations. Third, we drop the nine
constituencies where neither BJP nor INC emerged as either the winner or the runner-up. This
is motivated by the fact that these constituencies may in some sense be outliers, given how few
their number is (1.4%). Also since neither BJP nor INC occupied the rst two places, their
24inclusion may bias the estimates. All regressions in Tables 7 and 8 are weighted by the number
of electors. For brevity, we only report estimates from OLS regressions. The results from the
corresponding xed eects estimates are very similar.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 show the results for congwin, columns (5)-(8) are for congvote
and columns (9)-(12) are for congpcvote. For comparison purposes, columns (1), (5) and (9)
reports results from simple OLS regressions for INC which do not control for within district
correlations. Columns (5) and (9) are identical to columns (6) and (10) respectively of Table 5.
Column (2) introduces the percentage of electors in a constituency who exercised their franchise
as an independent variable. This is statistically signicant, implying that a 5% increase in
polling in a constituency would lead to about a 5% increase in the probability of INC winning
the seat. It also slightly reduces the coecient on the Chhattisgarh-Yr 2003 interaction term,
implying that part of the (relatively) better performance of INC in Chhattisgarh is due to a
higher turnout in that state.27 However, the coecient on the interaction term remains large
and statistically signicant even after controlling for voter turnout.
In column (3) we use standard errors that take account of within district correlations. Al-
though this increases the standard errors on the Chhattisgarh-Yr 2003 interaction term, it still
remains signicant at 5%. In column (4), we drop the outlying observations, but the results
remain very similar.
The results for congvote and congpcvote once again strongly conrm the robustness of the
results. Voter turnout is statistically signicant in each of these columns, implying a positive
but modest increase in the number and share of votes for INC as turnout rises. But it changes
27 One reason that voter turnout is positively related to the performance of INC is presumably the fact that
Congress relies much less on party cadres during voting compared to the BJP. In Indian politics, the conventional
wisdom is that cadre-based parties like the BJP and the communist parties do relatively better when voter turnout
is low, since these parties rely to a larger extent on its cadres or party faithfuls to show up and vote even when,
say, the weather is bad.
25the coecients on the other variables only marginally.
Table 8 shows the corresponding results for BJP. As expected, these generally mirror the
results for INC seen in Table 7. A 5% increase in polling for example would lead to about a 5%
decrease in the probability of BJP winning the seat. As above, controlling for turnout slightly
reduces the magnitude of the coecient on the Chhattisgarh-Yr 2003 interaction term, so that
part of the (relatively) worse performance of BJP in Chhattisgarh is accounted for by a higher
turnout in that state. However, the interaction term still remains signicant at 5% level.
Unlike for bjpwin, voter turnout is insignicant in the results for bjpvote and bjppcvote.
Allowing for within district correlations (columns 3, 7 and 11) or restricting the analysis to a
smaller sample (columns 4, 8 and 12) virtually leaves the results the same.
To sum, controlling for factors like voter turnout across constituencies does not seem to aect
the results substantially. The same is true when we control for within district correlations or
omit the outlying observations. The exact results are slightly magnied or diluted but the overall
picture is unchanged - there was a signicant divergence in voting pattern in Chhattisgarh in
the post-reorganization period.
Is the resemblance in voting pattern in 1998 a year specic eect?
To make sure that the results we obtained above are not driven by eects specic or unique to
1998, we use election results from the assembly elections of 1993.28 Table 9 presents evidence
that our earlier results are robust to inclusion of this additional year. We run equation (2) on
election data from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 assembly elections. For brevity we only report the
results for INC, the results for BJP present a very similar picture. The rst three columns show
the results for congwin, the next three are for congvote and the nal three for congpcvote. For
28 Elections in India, both at the state level and at the national level, are held every 5 years.
26each variable, we report both OLS and FE results. The OLS regressions in columns (2), (5) and
(8) allow for within-district correlations.
For congwin, there does not seem to be any dierence in voting patterns between Chhattis-
garh and Madhya Pradesh, either in 1993 or in 1998. But in 2003, Chhattisgarh residents were
much more in favor of INC than their counterparts in Madhya Pradesh. The same is true of
the other variables as well. In neither case do we nd any evidence of a divergence in voting
behavior prior to 2003, though in that year the dierences are large and statistically signicant.
We also ran alternative versions of these regressions where we controlled for voter turnout. The
results are qualitatively similar. Hence they are not reported here but are available on request.
We conclude that the change in voting patterns is unique to the 2003 assembly elections, and it
can largely be traced to the break-up that preceded it.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the dierence in share of votes polled by the BJP and INC
across constituencies in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.29 As can be seen, the distribution of
relative vote shares across constituencies in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh was very similar
in both 1993 and 1998. In 2003, however, there is a marked divergence - the distribution for
Chhattisgarh has shifted signicantly to the left, implying a change in voting patterns in favor
of INC.
Exogenous shocks aecting dierent demographic groups dierently
Table 10 investigates the performance of INC and BJP in the national elections in Madhya
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. The intuition here is that if there were any changes (policy or
otherwise) independent of the breakup between 1998 and 2003 that may have aected the
29 The graphs are kernel smoothed plots of dierences in share of votes polled by the BJP and INC across
constituencies in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. BJP vote share is dened as the share of votes polled
by BJP, similarly for INC vote share. The gures have been weighted by the total number of voters in each
constituency. (The graphs which do not weight the vote shares are very similar and hence not reported.)
27voting pattern of the dierent demographic groups dierently, this would also be re
ected in the
parliamentary elections that closely followed the 2003 assembly elections. (See section 5 for a
more detailed discussion.) Table 10 shows that there was little change in the voting behavior of
Chhattisgarh residents at the national elections in 2004.30 Therefore, the signicant divergence
evident in the 2003 state assembly elections seems unique to that elections, and is not re
ected in
the parliamentary elections, which occurred within six months of the former. This implies that
it is unlikely that our results are confounded by other extraneous factors dierentially aecting
the voting behavior of Chhattisgarh residents.
Voting pattern and change in demographic composition
Table 11 relates to the concern, discussed in section 5, that a change in the demographic compo-
sition may have caused a change in voting pattern in the 2003 assembly elections. It shows that
as expected, changes in both the number and percentage of female electors were very similar
across Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh during this period. In particular, there is no evidence
that there was a disproportionate increase in the number of women voters in Chhattisgarh in
2003, which arguably could drive our results. In fact, the coecient on the interaction term -
Chhattisgarh interacted with a dummy for the year 2003 - is negative in all the specications,
though it is never signicant. Note that, in line with the summary statistics presented in Ta-
ble 1, there is a signicantly higher percentage of women voters in Chhattisgarh compared to
Madhya Pradesh.31 Further, results in Table 10 too suggest that, among other things, changes
in demographic composition are unlikely to be a factor in the post-breakup divergence of voting
patterns since such changes, if any, would show up in the 2004 national elections as a break from
the earlier (1999) patterns.
30 It shows results for congwin and bjpwin only, the results for the other measures of electoral performance are
similar and hence are omitted.
31 The number of women voters in each constituency is on average lower for Chhattisgarh, but that just re
ects
the smaller size (in terms of population) of the constituencies in that state.
28Other Sensitivity Checks
Some nal comments are in order. First, a concern is whether our results are biased by local
factors such as weather. To investigate this issue, we consider a smaller sample consisting of
those assembly constituencies in Madhya Pradesh which lie just to the left of the border with
Chhattisgarh, and those Chhattisgarh constituencies which lie just to the right of the border. We
ran the same regressions as earlier (equations 1 and 2). The results for this sample of contiguous
districts are qualitatively similar to the above results and hence are not reported separately.
Second, as mentioned earlier, the better performance of INC in Chhattisgarh was not due to
its being `rewarded' in some way by the voters for help in creation of the state. The issue of a
separate state for Chhattisgarh has been supported by both the BJP and the INC in the past,
and there is no evidence that the voters favored either of the two parties on this issue.32
The third comment is about the role played by the smaller political parties. The support for
most of the existing smaller parties (SP, BSP, GGP, etc.) in Madhya Pradesh remained more
or less same across the years. But there was a new party contesting the elections in 2003, called
the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), and it seemed to have higher support in Chhattisgarh
than in Madhya Pradesh. However, the NCP in Chhattisgarh was really a breakaway faction of
the INC, headed by a former party stalwart (V. C. Shukla) who was a rival to the incumbent
Chief Minister Ajit Jogi. It is believed that most of the support for the NCP in this election
came from those who would have supported INC otherwise.33 Accounting for this would then
make our results even stronger.
Fourth, one important event that occured during this period was the Gujarat34 riots of
32 See e.g. the report on Chhattisgarh by Redi titled \Chhattisgarh Statehood is a Hot Political Issue"
(November 23, 1998), available online at www.redi.com/news/1998/nov/23chatti.htm.
33 See Sharma and Sharma (2003).
34 Gujarat is a western state in India. See the political map of India in Figure 1.
29February-March 2002, where an incident of re on a railway coach triggered Hindu-Muslim riots
in several parts of the state. The state government, under BJP control, was alleged to be slow
in responding to incidents of mob rampage and violence involving the minority (mainly Muslim)
communities. It is possible that this led to a shift in voter allegiance - the INC, considered the
more secular of the two parties, might be expected to increase its support among the minority
communities. Note, however, that this is unlikely to bias our results for two reasons. First, as
we have just seen, there were not any signicant dierences in the voting patterns of Madhya
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh residents in the parliamentary elections, which closely followed the
state elections, and where such shift in voter loyalties would be apparent.35 Second, the dierence
between the two states in the proportion of their populations belonging to dierent religions is
quite small. Muslims constitute a very small proportion of the population in both states and
both are overwhelmingly Hindu-majority. Hindus comprise more than 90% of the population
in both states (the all-India gure is about 80%). While the percentage of Muslims in India as
a whole is 13.4%, this number is much smaller and not much dierent across Madhya Pradesh
(about 6%) and Chhattisgarh (2.5%).36
Finally, there has been some recent reports of the BJP trying to increase its in
uence among
the tribal or indigenous people. A 2004 report in the New York Times37 describes how the Sangh
Parivar, the parent organization whose political arm is the BJP, is diligently trying to increase
its presence in the tribal belt in and around Chhattisgarh. To the extent this is true, our results
will be even stronger once we explicitly control for this. To the extent that such activities are
targeted towards the rural and backward sections of the population, who are otherwise more
35 To the extent that the riots were in a separate state, it is arguable that they would primarily aect voting
behavior at the national elections, more so since in this case the national elections closely followed the state
assembly elections. The latter are much more likely to be dominated by localized events and issues.
36 These numbers are from the decennial census of 2001.
37 Amy Waldman, Among India's Tribes, a Campaign for Hearts and Minds, New York Times, Section A,
Column 1, April 13, 2004.
30likely to vote for INC, some of these people might be inclined to switch to the BJP. This would
imply that the relative shift in favor of INC observed above is actually an underestimate.38
7 Conclusions
In this paper we focus on the reorganization of Indian states that occurred in 2000 to investigate
whether gains can be had from a redrawing of political boundaries. A recent strand of literature
in political economy has brought to the fore issues like the number and size of nations, setting
up tractable frameworks in which to analyze these questions. However, to date there is no
study that seeks to investigate the impact of a break-up of states on voting pattern and whether
secession leads to a closer conformity between the preferences of the electorate and the elected
representatives. This study addresses these important issues. In 2000, Madhya Pradesh, then
the biggest state in India, was subdivided into two smaller states, Madhya Pradesh and Chhat-
tisgarh. We argue that political preferences were distributed dierently in these two regions,
and show in a theoretical context that although in the pre-organization period voting behavior
of the smaller region will mimic that of the larger region, the post-reorganization voting pattern
will be dierent. We test this prediction using data on state elections in 1993, 1998 and 2003,
which straddle 2000, the year of the breakup. We nd that indeed in 2003 the voting pattern in
Chhattisgarh signicantly diered from that in Madhya Pradesh, even though in 1993 and 1998
both regions had voted very similarly. Several robustness checks conrm this basic nding. We
conclude that in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, there can be gains from creation of
new smaller states. In future research it would be interesting to see if such gains outweigh the
eciency losses from a separation and justify the existence of smaller homogeneous entities.
38 Note that to date these activities are primarily aimed at providing essential social services like health and
education to poor people, though there are occasional religious and conversion activities. There are no reports
yet of a signicant resentment towards these volunteers which might induce a backlash against the BJP at the
polls and confound our results.
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34Table 1: Summary Statistics for Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
Madhya Pradesh Chhattisgarh All-India
Land Area 308,346 sq. km. 135,100 sq. km.
Capital Bhopal Raipur
Districts 45 16
Population (2001) 60.39 20.80 1027.02
(in millions)
Percentage Female (2001) 47.91 49.74 48.27
Percentage Urban (2001) 26.67 20.08 27.78
Population Density (2001) 196 154 312
(People per sq. km.)
Child Sex Ratio (2001) Rural 941 982 934
(Females per 1000 Male) Urban 906 941 903
Crude Birth Rate (2001) Total 30.8 25.4 26.3
Rural 32.8 27.1 29.0
Urban 23.0 20.2 22.4
Crude Death Rate (2001) Total 10.0 8.8 8.4
Rural 10.8 10.1 9.0
Urban 7.2 7.0 6.3
Natural Growth Rate (2001) Total 20.8 17.5 17.0
Rural 22.0 18.9 18.0
Urban 15.9 15.4 13.9
Infant Mortality Rate (2001) Total 86 76 66
Rural 92 88 72
Urban 53 56 42
Reserved for Scheduled Caste Members 33 (14.35%) 10 (11.11%)
Reserved for Scheduled Tribe Members 41 (17.83%) 34 (37.78%)
Number of Assembly Constituencies 230 90
Source: Most of the gures are taken from the 2001 Census of India. The last three rows are from the Election
Commission of India.Table 2a: Support for BJP and INC across Dierent Segments of Population
(All-India Survey, 2003, all gures in percentages)
Brahmin Kshatriya Kayastha Jat Vaishya SCs STs
Support BJP 71 59 66 61 56 43 46
Support INC 26 39 32 36 39 55 50
Don't Know 3 2 1 2 4 2 4
Notes: Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Kayasthas, Jats and Vaishyas comprise the traditional upper castes. SC and ST stand for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively and constitute the most disadvantaged sections of the Indian population.
Source for tables 2a and 2b: The data for this table come from the India Today-Aaj Tak-ORG-MARG poll, reported in
the February 9, 2004 issue of India Today International. In the original data, there was a substantial fraction of correspondents
replying \Others" (meaning other political parties) for all the segments. Since in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, unlike most
other parts of India, parties other than BJP and INC account only for a small share of the votes polled we have rescaled the
numbers proportionally.
Table 2b: Support for BJP and INC across Dierent Segments of Population
(All-India Survey, 2003, all gures in percentages)
Male Female
Support BJP 54 48
Support INC 43 48
Don't Know 3 3
Table 2c: Support for BJP and INC across Dierent Segments of Population
(All-India Survey, December, 1997, all gures in percentages)
General (All) Rural Lower Caste Upper Caste
Party Support BJP 50 48 46 66
INC 50 52 54 34
Source: The data for this table come from the India Today-ORG-MARG poll, reported in the January 5, 1998 issue of India Today.
Like in Tables 2(a) and 2(b), we have rescaled the numbers proportionally.Table 3: Electoral Performance of BJP and INC, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
(1998 and 2003 Assembly Elections)
1998 Elections 2003 Elections
Madhya Pradesh Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh Chhattisgarh
Total Seats 230 90 230 90
Seats won by BJP 83 36 173 50
Percentage of Seats won by BJP 36.09 40.00 75.22 55.56
Percentage of Votes won by BJP 38.84 39.11 42.50 39.26
Seats won by INC 124 48 38 37
Percentage of Seats won by INC 53.91 53.33 16.52 41.11
Percentage of Votes won by INC 41.21 41.01 31.60 36.71
Source: Authors' calculations from the 1993 and 1998 election results of undivided Madhya Pradesh, and
the 2003 election results of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.Table 4: Percentage of Total Electors who Voted, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
(1998 and 2003 Assembly Elections)
OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2)
Chhattisgarh 0.06 0.18 0.18
(1.12) (1.05) (1.83)
Yr 2003 7.35 7.21 7.21 7.35 7.19
(0.70) (0.71) (0.56) (0.37) (0.35)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 2003 3.61 3.72 3.72 3.61 3.73
(1.47) (1.40) (0.90) (0.62) (0.58)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.91 0.91
Observations 640 640 640 640 640
Weighted N Y Y N Y
Within-District Correlations N N Y { {
The dependent variable is the percentage of total electors in an assembly constituency who cast their votes.
Chhattisgarh is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of the Chhattisgarh region. Yr
2003 is a dummy variable for year 2003. The regressions in columns (2) are weighted by the number of electors in
the constituency. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh in 1998, and 230 and 90 in
Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively in 2003. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ,  denote
signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 5: Performance of INC (Congress(I)) in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
(1998 and 2003 Assembly Elections)
Whether Won Number of Votes Polled Percentage of Votes Polled
Probit FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Chhattisgarh -0.01 -0.01 -2191 -2124 -0.19 -0.19
(0.06) (0.06) (1540) (1972) (1.34) (1.37)
Yr 2003 -0.39 -0.39 -0.37 -0.38 677 661 761 737 -9.66 -9.72 -9.55 -9.55
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (1346) (1804) (740) (769) (1.12) (1.14) (0.80) (0.79)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 2003 0.30 0.31 0.25 0.27 5792 6618 5747 6370 4.67 4.83 4.59 4.69
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (2303) (3030) (1440) (1591) (1.76) (1.78) (1.47) (1.51)
R2 0.10 0.10 0.57 0.57 0.02 0.02 0.84 0.87 0.13 0.14 0.76 0.76
Observations 640 640 640 640 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 635
Weighted N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if INC won the seat, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is the
number of votes polled by INC in each seat. The dependent variable in columns (9)-(12) is the percentage of votes polled by INC in each seat. Chhattisgarh is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of the Chhattisgarh region. Yr 2003 is a dummy variable for year 2003. Columns (1)-(2) show results from
running probit regressions, the gures shown are the estimated eects for discrete changes in the dummy variables from 0 to 1. The OLS regressions for this variable are
very similar to the probit ones, and hence are omitted. The regressions in even-numbered columns are weighted by the number of electors in the constituency. There
were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. +, ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 6: Performance of BJP in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
(1998 and 2003 Assembly Elections)
Whether Won Number of Votes Polled Percentage of Votes Polled
Probit FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Chhattisgarh 0.04 0.05 -1460 -1211 0.27 0.22
(0.06) (0.06) (1479) (1973) (1.31) (1.39)
Yr 2003 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39 14111 15124 14111 15030 3.37 3.58 3.37 3.58
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (1448) (2039) (858) (1036) (1.08) (1.13) (0.72) (0.75)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 2003 -0.25 -0.27 -0.24 -0.25 -2965 -2541 -2965 -2840+ -3.08+ -2.98 -3.08 -3.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (2559) (3707) (1457) (1687) (1.84) (1.92) (1.40) (1.46)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.57 0.57 0.17 0.15 0.86 0.88 0.02 0.02 0.76 0.76
Observations 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640
Weighted N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if BJP won the seat, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is the
number of votes polled by BJP in each seat. The dependent variable in columns (9)-(12) is the percentage of votes polled by BJP in each seat. Chhattisgarh is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of the Chhattisgarh region. Yr 2003 is a dummy variable for year 2003. Columns (1)-(2) show results from
running probit regressions, the gures shown are the estimated eects for discrete changes in the dummy variables from 0 to 1. The OLS regressions for this variable are
very similar to the probit ones, and hence are omitted. The regressions in even-numbered columns are weighted by the number of electors in the constituency. There
were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. +, ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 7: Performance of INC in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh - Robustness Checks
(1998 and 2003 Assembly Elections)
Whether Won the Seat Number of Votes Polled Percentage of Votes Polled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Chhattisgarh -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -2124 -2178 -2178 -2690 -0.19 -0.22 -0.22 -0.78
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (1972) (1958) (2621) (2592) (1.37) (1.37) (1.97) (1.92)
Yr 2003 -0.38 -0.41 -0.41 -0.42 661 -2151 -2151 -2332+ -9.72 -11.19 -11.19 -11.50
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (1804) (1962) (1429) (1325) (1.14) (1.25) (1.24) (1.13)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 2003 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 6618 5107 5107 5130 4.83 4.04 4.04 4.16
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (3030) (2605) (2329) (2294) (1.78) (1.76) (2.06) (2.07)
Percentage of Electors 0.01 0.01+ 0.01 398 398 412 0.21 0.21 0.23
who Voted (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (88) (137) (134) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.17
Observations 640 640 640 631 635 635 635 631 635 635 635 631
Allow for Within-
District Correlations N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Shorter Sample N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if INC won the seat, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is the
number of votes polled by INC in each seat. The dependent variable in columns (9)-(12) is the percentage of votes polled by INC in each seat. Chhattisgarh is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of the Chhattisgarh region. Yr 2003 is a dummy variable for year 2003. All the results are from OLS regressions
- the results from FE regressions are very similar and hence are omitted. The regressions are weighted by the number of electors in the constituency. There were 320
assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. The standard errors
in columns (3)-(4), (7)-(8) and (11)-(12) allow for correlations within districts. Columns marked (4), (8) and (12) drop the nine observations where neither BJP nor
INC emerged as the winner or the runner-up. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 8: Performance of BJP in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh - Robustness Checks
(1998 and 2003 Assembly Elections)
Whether Won the Seat Number of Votes Polled Percentage of Votes Polled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Chhattisgarh 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -1211 -1229 -1229 -1557 0.22 0.22 0.22 -0.19
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (1973) (1969) (2661) (2677) (1.39) (1.39) (1.79) (1.80)
Yr 2003 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.45 15124 14397 14397 14809 3.58 3.42 3.42 3.59
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (2039) (2356) (2318) (2477) (1.13) (1.24) (1.17) (1.40)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 2003 -0.25 -0.22 -0.22 -0.24 -2541 -2916 -2916 -3367+ -2.98 -3.06+ -3.06+ -3.33+
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (3707) (3750) (2176) (2249) (1.92) (1.90) (1.66) (1.78)
Percentage of Electors -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 101 101 104 0.02 0.02 0.03
who Voted (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (107) (191) (189) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Observations 640 640 640 631 640 640 640 631 640 640 640 631
Allow for Within-
District Correlations N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Shorter Sample N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if BJP won the seat, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is
the number of votes polled by BJP in each seat. The dependent variable in columns (9)-(12) is the percentage of votes polled by BJP in each seat. Chhattisgarh is
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of the Chhattisgarh region. Yr 2003 is a dummy variable for year 2003. All the results are from
OLS regressions - results from the FE regressions are very similar and hence are omitted. The regressions are weighted by the number of electors in the constituency.
There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. The
standard errors in columns (3)-(4), (7)-(8) and (11)-(12) allow for correlations within districts. Columns marked (4), (8) and (12) drop the nine observations where
neither BJP nor INC emerged as the winner or the runner-up. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 9: Performance of INC in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh - Robustness Checks
(1993, 1998 and 2003 Assembly Elections)
Whether Won Number of Votes Polled Percentage of Votes Polled
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Chhattisgarh 0.08 0.08 -2712 -2712 -0.88 -0.88
(0.06) (0.07) (1584) (2198) (1.39) (1.82)
Yr 1998 0.02 0.02 0.03 4163 4163 3743 -0.12 -0.12 -0.30
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (1459) (1502) (970) (1.19) (1.16) (0.87)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 1998 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 588 588 807 0.69 0.69 0.85
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (2529) (1842) (1601) (1.95) (1.55) (1.61)
Yr 2003 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 4824 4824 4430 -9.83 -9.83 -9.91
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (1466) (1539) (963) (1.05) (1.20) (0.85)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 2003 0.17 0.17+ 0.17 7206 7206 7211 5.51 5.51 5.58
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (2792) (2130) (1642) (1.79) (2.17) (1.61)
R2 0.11 0.11 0.44 0.05 0.05 0.77 0.13 0.13 0.66
Observations 960 960 960 953 953 953 953 953 953
Allow for Within-
District Correlations N Y { N Y { N Y {
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if INC won the seat, 0 otherwise. The dependent
variable in columns (4)-(6) is the number of votes polled by INC in each seat. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the
percentage of votes polled by INC in each seat. Chhattisgarh is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of
the Chhattisgarh region. Yr 1998 and Yr 2003 are dummy variables for years 1998 and 2003 respectively. All regressions are weighted
by the number of electors in the constituency. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90
in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard
errors in columns (2), (5) and (8) allow for correlations within districts. +, ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 10: Performance of INC and BJP in National Parliamentary Elections, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
(1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha Elections)
Whether INC won Whether BJP Won
OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Chhattisgarh -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10)
Yr 2004 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16+ 0.16
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 2004 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.07)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.66 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.67
Observations 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640
Weighted N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Allow for Within-
Par. Constituency Correlations N N Y N N N Y N
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if INC was the leading party in the seat,
0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is similarly a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if BJP was the
leading party the seat, 0 otherwise. Chhattisgarh is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of the
Chhattisgarh region. Yr 2004 is a dummy variable for year 2004. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya
Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. The standard errors in columns (3) and (7) take account of clustering at the parliamentary constituency
level. +, ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 11: Change in Female Electors in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
(1993, 1998 and 2003 Assembly Elections)
Number of Female Electors Percentage of Female Electors
OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Chhattisgarh -1496 -1065 -1065 { 2.00 1.95 1.97 {
(1329) (1928) (2445) (0.15) (0.18) (0.26)
Yr 1998 6900 8019 8019 7484 -0.21 -0.25+ -0.25 -0.23
(1123) (1855) (845) (571) (0.14) (0.14) (0.06) (0.05)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 1998 -778 -1065 -1065 -923 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(2138) (3315) (989) (1134) (0.21) (0.25) (0.12) (0.10)
Yr 2003 17563 19459 19459 18818 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09+
(1292) (2130) (1419) (691) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07) (0.05)
Chhattisgarh * Yr 2003 -2565 -2121 -2121 -2314 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
(2542) (4289) (2135) (1481) (0.21) (0.24) (0.17) (0.10)
R2 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.95 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.94
Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960
Weighted N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Allow for Within-
District Correlations N N Y N N N Y N
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is the (absolute) number of female electors in a constituency. The dependent variable
in columns (5)-(8) is the percentage of female electors in a constituency. Chhattisgarh is a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 if the constituency is part of the Chhattisgarh region. Yr 1998 is a dummy variable for year 1998, similarly for Yr 2003.
There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
respectively after the reconstitution. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors in columns (3) and (7)




Figure 1. Political Map of India showing the different states as of 2004.  
 
Notes: The names of states are in upper case letters (e.g. Madhya Pradesh), the names of 
the respective capital cities are in lower case letters (e.g. Bhopal). There are currently 28 
states and 7 union territories in India.  
 





Figure 2. Relative Preference in favor of BJP, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh  




Notes: The graphs show the kernel smoothed plots of differences in share of votes polled by the 
BJP and INC across constituencies in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. BJP vote share is defined 
as the share of votes polled by BJP, similarly for INC vote share. The figures have been weighted 
by the total number of voters in each constituency. (The graphs which do not weight the vote share 
are very similar and hence not reported.) 
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BJP vote share - INC vote share
 Madhya Pradesh in 1998  Chhattisgarh in 1998





BJP vote share - INC vote share
 Madhya Pradesh in 2003   Chhattisgarh in 2003
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